Italy At A Glance - January 2008

Welcome to the Italian Economy Watch Blog. Below you will find the normal chronological blog posts. But first we would like to present some charts which provide background data which we hope will help the first time reader better assess and get to grips with the argument being presented on the blog. In what follows you can find charts for Italian male life expectancy, median age, quarterly GDP growth, inflation, household demand, retail sales, and import and exports growth. Basically this data provides a summary of the argument which we are presenting on this blog, which is that in order to understand Italy's long term and ongoing economic malaise you need to understand something about Italian demography, and it's macroeconomic consequences. Please click on thumbnails for better viewing.

On the left you can see a chart for Italian male life expectancy, and on the right there is one showing the evolution of the Italy's median age between 1990 and 2020. Just why such factors are important, and need to be taken into account along with more standard macro economic data in accounting for Italy's stubbornly low growth rate since the mid 1990s is explained in the posts.

With such weak internal consumption growth Italy badly needs to run a trade surplus to obtain the economic growth necessary to make public finances sustainable. In this Italy is similar to Germany and Japan, and different from domestic consumer driven economies like the UK, France and Ireland. Long term fertility and life expectancy really do matter, since they condition labour force growth



and consumption patterns, and with these productivity and the growth of internal credit and consumer demand. Above left you can find Italy's ferility rate, and above right the evolution of the 25 to 49 age group, which has just passed it historic peak. On either side here you can see charts for recent quarterly GDPand long run annual GDP.


Next on the left we have a chart for recent movements in Italian inflation while on the right we can see changes in the trade gap between exports and imports. Inflation is reasonably tamed in Italy (now why?), despite the recent slight uptick, but it is Italy's inability to generate a trade surplus which is the main problem structurally.


Now on the left we have the chart for household consumption and on the right the recent retail sales data. Finally the chart on the bottom left shows recent movements in Italy's business confidence index,while the chart on the right shows the equivalent data for consumer confidence.Bottom line, the evidence of growing weakness is everywhere.

Arguably these are all the data points you need to understand my lengthy post on The Euro Area and Italy's De-Facto Dependence On Exports, as well as why it is that the danger Italy may once more fall into recession presents us with the difficulty of what the credit ratings agencies will say about the resulting impact on the government debt situation.


2008 Forecasts: The OECD in December revised their 2007 Italian forecast down to 1.8%, and the 2008 one down to 1.3%. Confindustria also revised their forecast down in December, arguing that growth would slow to 1 percent in 2008 from an 1.8 percent this year, citing factors like the rising cost of food and oil and the rise of the euro against the dollar. Such numbers are clearly not encouraging, but arguably downside risk for 2008 is greater even than either the OECD or the Confindustria forecasts reflect Morgan Stanley's Vladimir Pillona is somewhat more sanguine. While presenting the MS central forceast for Italian economic growth to slow to 1.0%Y in 2008, from 1.8%Y in 2007, he goes on to note that "even annual GDP growth of 0.5%Y next year has a significant possibility of occurring, as shown by our model’s forecast error bands".

I personally will be very surprised if we still see calendar year 2008 anything like as high as 1.8%, but more to the point even 1.3% may be rather on the high side if we get a significant deterioration in the external environment, especially in Eastern Europe on which Italy is fairly dependent, and where the Italian banking sector has significant exposure. So that puts me much nearer to Pillona's "basement bargain" number of 0.5% than to any of the others. One of the reasons for my pessimism relates to my assessment of Italy's current trend growth rate, and to the level of fiscal and monetary tightening which may be operating on the economy even as it slows. During 2007 the Italian govenment has been running a fiscal deficit of comfortably below the 3% of GDP required by the EU commission. But since this fortunate situation was in part acheieved by the use of one off measures, and in part by the strong tax inflow from the above trend growth, the government will need to maintain a comparatively tight fiscal stance to keep things on course, and any attempt to further loosen may run into real problems with the EU commission and the credit rating agencies. And as I keep arguing, it is very hard to see an accomodative monetary posture from the ECB in the near future. The IMF in their October World Economic Outlook came in with a similar figure of 1.3% for 2008, the Economist Intelligence Unit is forecasting 1.7% in 2007 and 1.4 in 2008, and the latter 2008 figure was also endorsed by the EU commission in its November forecast.

As I indicate, my own view is well to the downside of all this. The only apparent bright spot on the horizon is employment, but I am dubious that in the context of Italy's ageing workforce this will work through as some are hoping, as I expain at some considerable length in this post here. My opinion is that Italy will enter recession at some point during 2008, and that we may well have 2 consecutive quarters of negative growth. The continuing high euro will maintain pressure on Italian exports, and high oil and food prices will maintain pressure on the inflation front, at least in the firts half of 2008. At the same time, and despite rumours that Romano Prodi's government is compemplating a large tax cutting package, I anticipate that the fiscal environment will remain tight. Italy's large (106% GDP) accumulated debt, and the vigilance from the gentlmen at Standard and Poor's and the other credit rating agencies more or less guarantee that.

As most of the forecasts suggest, we have been seeing growth which is somewhat above trend during the upswing in the last couple of years, so it would not be surprising if we now saw some below trend growth. Trend growth (over a 5 year average) in Italy may even have fallen into the 0.5 to 1% range, so if I have to put a number I would say 0.7% with a definite "downside risk" tag attached. The nearest forecast to this that I have seen is the 1% one from the Morgan Stanley GEF team. The implications of such sustained low growth are, I think, important, since if Italy cannot find the way to raise trend growth up towards the 2% mark there is simply no way the government debt can be stabilised and sustained. And with each passing year we have one year less to crunch time.

Monday, June 20, 2005

Italy: Devaluation or Deflation

Italy is in recession. There is nothing extraordinary about this, as Donald Rumsfeld notoriously said 'stuff happens', and economies do have their ups and downs. But this recession is a little different, since it is structural and not cyclical. For the Italian economy to return to a better trajectory something has to be done, but what? Morgan Stanley's Vicenzo Guzzo offers two alternatives: devaluation, or deflation (actually the way he puts the alternatives it sounds to me more like a case of: "with which instrument would you prefer I cut your throat sir, the stanley knife or the chain saw"?).

"If Italy intended to restore the pre-1999 competitiveness level, it would have to experience a 25% currency depreciation. While the euro is now down over 5% from the start of the year, such a large correction appears unlikely at this stage. In addition, the economy has steadily lost ground also vis-?-vis its euro area trading partners, as the breakdown of the trade data suggests. Euro depreciation would provide no oxygen on that front. In order to return to pre-1999 competitiveness levels, Italy would have to abandon the current exchange arrangements. To put it bluntly, it would have to drop out of EMU. A 25% devaluation is equivalent to what the economy experienced between 1991 and 1995. Exports scored double-digit gains in the aftermath of the realignment, but domestic demand fell heavily and debt services costs hit 12.5% of GDP. In a replay of those years, Italy would either default on its debt or run toxically tight fiscal policy. This is simply not an option, in my view."

So Italy is caught. To devalue it would have to leave EMU. But then even if it could and did, it would go bust. So, on Guzzo's reading, the only remedy left is substantial deflation, that is an ongoing reduction of wages and prices which would enable competitiveness to be restored. This sounds very much like the 1930's and an Italy stuck with a modern version of the gold standard. It also sounds like going through a recession which could turning out lasting for a number of years, even if this was politically feasible it would be extraordinarily painful for many of those most immediately affected.

This, of course, is a question which is widely treated in the textbooks. So would anyone like to suggest a rival 'escape strategy'?

3 comments:

Anonymous said...

As Berlusconi is singularly implicated in this economic debacle, perhaps the incoming Prodi government could start by confiscating the entire value of the "balding one's" media empire and then (politely) request other similarly wealthy individuals who have benefited from some of scams perpetrated by the previous administration to also contribute (albeit on a more optional basis).

This fund might help to soften the blow for Italian citizens screwed by Berlusconi and his fellow crooks!

Anonymous said...

An Increase in labor productivity would increase the competitiveness of the italian economy without the need for devaluation. Recent german experiances provide an excellent example of labor market reforms helping an economy--even when bound by the EMU.

Edward Hugh said...

Hi there,

"An Increase in labor productivity would increase the competitiveness of the italian economy without the need for devaluation."

Of course, the question is given the demographic profile Italy has, and the rising median age of the population, it is far from clear that this will be possible. The human capital stock is also changing negatively as young educated Italians leave to be replaced by lower eductaed immigrants.

Don't misunderstand me , I'm not against immigration, au contraire, Italy needs migrants to make up for the missing births, but we need to think about a lot of factors here. Stopping the outward flow of graduates would be a good first move, but you need to be able to create well paid positions before the age of 30 to do this. This means a big change in corporate mentality. Otherwise people just up for the US, Canada, the UK, Australia or whatever, where they can start earning reasonably well from 25/26. The simplistic story on labour market reform does not address this issue.

Then you need to think about the demand side, since to get sufficient GDP growth to finance the deficit you need to have internal demand growth, and this is just where the elderly societies - Germany, Japan, and Italy - are experiencing greatest difficulty. So while Germany has gotten the productivity gains you mention, it has also become totally dependent on exports (ditto Japan) and still will have difficulty getting ternd growth of over 1%, and like this Italy undoubtedly goes bust at some point.

The consumer demand issue is really the key one, and needs to be grasped in its entirety. Claus Vistesen has a first pass at Japan here, and at Germany and the Eurozone here.


Anyway, thanks for passing by and taking the trouble to leave a comment.