Italy Economy Real Time Data Charts

Edward Hugh is only able to update this blog from time to time, but he does run a lively Twitter account with plenty of Italy related comment. He also maintains a collection of constantly updated Italy economy charts together with short text updates on a Storify dedicated page Italy - Lost in Stagnation?


Monday, January 21, 2008

More on the Italian Labour Market

This post is really a follow up to my earlier post (which you can find here), on the changing dynamics of the Italian labour market. But before I get into that it is really worth commenting on how things are really heating up now in the eurozone interest rate debate, and in the euro-dollar currency markets. In the middle of last week Luxembourg's Central Bank Governor Yves Mersch set the ball rolling when he warned of "downside risks" to growth in the eurozone, sending in the process the yield on the 10-year German benchmark bond below 4 percent for the first time in seven weeks. Then ECB official Axel Weber said in Cyprus that euro-region inflation would slow toward the bank's 2 percent ceiling later this year, despite the fact that prices grew an annual 3.1 percent in December. This is more or less code language for saying that growth would slow, and that interest rates would come down. This has some significance since Weber has - up to now - been more or less in the "hawks" camp at the ECB. This was followed by Portugal's Finance Minister Fernando Teixeira dos Santos staement that he shared "concerns that the slowdown in European economies could be somewhat stronger than we expected a few months ago" and then of course we had the downward revision in the 2008 Italian forecast from the Bank of Italy, which I have already commented on.

So it seems the economic slowdown is finally being recognised as what it is, a far more general one than a simple sub-Prime issue in the United States.

This process has accelerated further this morning, witth the euro falling to a five-month low against the yen after European Central Bank council member Nout Wellink admitted that economic growth may slow more than policy makers had expected. Wellink suggested that eurozone growth will be closer to 1.5 percent than 2.5 percent in the coming year. All of this is causing a good deal of uncertainty in the currency markets with the euro falling 1.8 percent against the dollar in the past five days to a three-week low of $1.4510. This is, of course, still a very high value, but what we need to be aware of is that what causes most damage, economically speaking, are violent swings, and at this point in time there is no guarantee that we may not be in for one of those.

What's interesting about this Bloomberg article is the way these statements are being read. That is, higher than desireable inflation is now no longer the plus it was (we have been living for some months now on top of a discourse where inflation was virtually being seen as a positive by currency traders since it meant that interest rates, and hence yield differentials, would rise). This discourse seems to be coming to a rather abrupt end. We could perhaps notice some first indication in Romania in the middle of last week, where the focus moved from the inflation there driving up yield, to the fact that the central bank effectively needs to maintain rates up to stop capital outflows. Hungary is a very similar case (and here). This is also being reflected in a weakening in the so called carry trade and steady upward pressure on both the Swiss Franc and the Japanese Yen.


So the fact that the ECB may be tardy in dropping rates is no longer being read as a euro positive. Market participants seem to be reaching out further into the future, and are thinking more about the future path of relative currency values. Since the ECB can't cut, economic growth will tank more than it would do otherwise, and then the ECB will cut vigourously, so at that point the euro will fall. This seems to be the reasoning, of course, by having the thought these participants simply bring forward the moment when the decline starts, and as a result it starts to fall now. I think this is a sea change.

Of course, if, as the article suggests, the euro is about to follow the euro into "swoon", which currencies are going to rise, since given that currency values are relative, we can't all fall at once. My feeling is that the US administration will resist any strong upward correction in the dollar, since they have their own issues to think about - and not least among them the trade deficit - which mean that weaknesses in domestic consumption need to be compensated for by exports, and as a result dollar competitiveness becomes important. In this context Claus Vistesens latest note this morning is, as ever, interesting.

OK, now for the Italian labour market.

In what follows I intend to step back from the precipice a bit, and take a rather longer term look at one feature of Italy's economic performance, its labour and employment market. In this sense this post is going to form part of a "tripple whammy" I am working on, where I will attempt to carry out an in depth examination of possible connections and interconnections which may exist between population ageing, rapid job creation and weak internal consumption in three key G7 economies: Italy, Germany (see here) and Japan.

Rising-Employment Falling-Consumption?



Well lets start by looking at the story so far, at least as far as Italy goes. Fortunately we do have a number of key stylised facts at our disposal. First off, unemployment has been steadily - I could say relentlessly - dropping in Italy over the last two or three years:



and new jobs have been created, lots of them:




Yet at the same time domestic demand has not been revived to anything like the extent that might have been expected. Retail sales have been in decline for most of the last year as you can see from this retail-sales purchasing-managers-index for Italy (remember that on the PMI reading, anything below 50 represents a contraction).



Meanwhile private household consumption, despite some early strengthening, could hardly be said to have been booming. We did see a couple of (in Italian terms) comparatively strong quarters in the first half of 2007, but then, surprisingly - as can be seen in the chart below - the rate of increase began to weaken in Q3, while, curiuosly, in the position in the Italian labour market remained, more or less, stable.



So how can we account for this apparent paradox of a steadily tightening labour market and deteriorating internal consumer demand? One explanation for this could, of course, be that labour market performance is a lagged indicator (that is that it only registers economic deterioration after other indicators have been pointing to red for some time, and this is surely true), but could there not be something more going on here? Especially since this kind of pattern is being repeated in Germany and Japan, and these two countries have, along with Italy, the highest global median age, and as a result the highest proportions of potential workers in the older age groups. There is something very different about the labour market tightening we are seeing in Italy, Japan and Germany, for example, and the kind of inflation generating labour market tightening which we are observing in Eastern Europe. So why this difference?

Italy's Age Structure

But first off let's take a look at one of the younger age groups for a minute, the 15 to 24 one. As is well known this group is now in historic decline as a proportion of the total Italian population. The decline has been very rapid, with a drop of around one third (from 15% to 10% of the population) since 1990.



What this means, logically enough, is that there are steadily less and less people in this age group to fill places in the labour market. To this numerical decline we need to add theongoing secular decline in economic activity rates among this group, as more and more of Italy's - now scarce resource - young people delay entry and seek to improve their education, their human capital rating and hence their future earning capacity.



Thus the proportion of this group which is economically active has been declining steadily, as have the absolute numbers of those who are active, and the numbers of those who are actually employed. It is perhaps worth noting that the absolute size of this age group has been virtually stationary over the last 3 or 4 years (a statistical effect), but it is now set to fall steadily.



So if new employees will be hard to come by in this age group as we move forward, where can employment growth come from? Well basically there are two evident potential sources of labour, immigration and older workers. It is hard to envisage any large increase in employment in the 25 to 34 or the 35 to 54 age groups since - as can be seen from the chart below - activity rates among these groups are already fairly high, and even the slight fall-off which can be seen to have taken place recently in the 25 to 34 age group seems to be the result of a decline in female activity rates, and this is almost to be hoped for if Italy is to do one thing which is very important for its long term future, and that is have more children. Squeezing this particular lemon too hard at this point in time is only likely to obtain short term benefit in return for substantial negative long term outcomes.



Turning now to the principle sources of potential long run labour supply, in the first place it is obvious enough that there has been a significant surge in the size of the immigrant workforce in recent years (see chart below, and my other post for more details).


The other main potential source of additional labour in an ageing economy is the over 55 age group (and as we move forward of course increasingly it will become the over 65 one). Now many international agencies (the World Bank, the OECD, the IMF, the EU Commission etc) are pinning their hopes on the idea that the effects of population ageing may be to some extent offset by increasing the participation rates of these older workers, presenting impressive looking projections all the way out to 2050 to back their view that this is a workable solution. Yet since we have, in the here and now, a number of examples of societies who are trying quite hard to follow recommendations here, I do think it is important to examine in detail what is actually happening in these societies and try to really start to estimate the longer term macroeconomic consequences of this shift.

Now the important thing to bear in mind when we speak of older workers is that the important decision they need to take is about whether or not to continue working, and what is very clear in the Italian context is that workers in the 55 to 64 age group are increasingly taking the decision to stay at work, in some form or another.



Not only is the activity rate - which has, it must be said, been ridiculously low for this group, especially given Italy's very high life expectancy level - on the way up, the unemployment rate is on its way down, and the number of those employed is steadily rising.

More Work, Less Pay?


What is also significant about this trend is that it is also associated with a significant growth in part time and temporary work. The question really is who is doing this part-time/temporary work? In Japan it has become clear that many people now leave their "lifelong" job at 55, only to continue working in some way shape or form for another 15 years or so (both the Economist and the Financial Times have recently run articles about this trend in Japan - see here - although they fail to explicitly lock-it-in to the ageing population issue, which I think is where it belongs) . The work ethic in Japan is probably quite different from the one in Italy, but the similarities in the way the labour markets are evolving are really quite striking . In the German context it is also clear that the growth in part time and in non-social-security covered employment has been significant. And of course, in Germany, as I explain at considerable length here, the big increase in employment is in comparatively low skill, low wage work, which very often draws the over 55s into employment in much the same way and for much the same reasons as it does in Italy and Japan.

So what IS observable in the case of all 3 of these economies is that they are experiencing at one and the same time skill-shortages in some key areas of economic activity (due to the growing population crunch among the young - Japan for example is notoriously short of nurses) and generating large volume employment in more tenuous and lower skilled categories of work, since such work meets the skill and performance profile of the workforce they really have available. Thus, even as these labour markets tighten we find NO real evidence of significant wage-squeeze push.

From this point in we are left guessing until someone does some really systematic research, but it isn't a bad guess to suggest that the pressure on wages in the more skilled areas is being offset by a downward movement in wages in those less skilled areas where a mixture of lower skilled migrants, retirees and older workers are offering themselves for work in increasing numbers.

One other conjecture about Italy is that migrants are doing jobs in Italy which retired or semi-retired workers are doing in Germany and Japan, and hence we find that the participation rates in the 55 to 64 age group are still pretty low. At the moment I'm not quite sure what the macro economic consequences of this are going to be.

My feeling is that since people reaching 60 can now expect to live quite a long time, and since nowadays there is no great certainty attached to current levels of retirement benefit as we move forward, then older people, who are normally more prudent, will be protecting their current savings - in whatever form they may hold them - as best they can, and supplementing pensions with bits and pieces of work to maintain living standards so as to not run down their capital.

Another point here is that many retirees in Italy have a lot less in the way of accumulated wealth (and imagine the situation in a country like Hungary, which is the next one coming in this group as far as I can see, even though the median age is somewhat younger, but the male life expectancy is also much lower, and the population is already falling) in comparison with Germany and Japan.

This is why the recent deal Prodi struck with the Italian unions about postponing raising the retirement age was such a negative when viewed from where I am sitting.

So what I am suggesting is that the very weak internal consumption we are seeing in these three countries (and I would drop-in that Hungary is "coupling" here perfectly with the others, in terms of the model I am working on) is not ONLY associated with a higher propensity to save associated with older people, but also to do with the earnings profile associated with the new kinds of low level work older people are doing. In other words you can't just take the large number of new jobs being created and translate this into more consumption (as I think most of the conventional analysts are doing) since more things are happening here.

North-South Regional Stresses and Imbalances


But in any event the data we have is fascinating. The regional disequilibrium in Italy seem to be once more becoming really important (just like East-West one in Germany, and Tokyo vs the rest in Japan). While the national participation rate for the 55 to 64 age group went up from 28.9% in Q1 2004 to 33% in Q3 2007, in the mezzogiorno it has gone up from 31.8 to 35.3 over the samer period, so the South is keeping pace here, but if we look at the 65 plus group, while participation has gone from 3.4% to 4% nationally over the same period, in the mezzogiorno it has gone DOWN from 2.4 to 2.1%. The 15 to 64 participation rate also dropped from 54.1 to 52.5 over the period in the mezzogiorno while in the North it went up from 67.8 to 69.2 %. And this situation is reflected in the relative job creation performance between the North and the South.






Basically, given the very strong fiscal pressure which is about to come in Italy, and the danger IMHO of a sovereign default at some point if nothing is done to correct this very weak growth trajectory, Italy can be almost literally torn apart by this disequilibrium, especially given that it is reinforced by the unequal distribution of migrants. We have an ongoing polarisation of wealth, employment and people, and we really aren't giving sufficient consideration to the longer term political implications of the underlying economo-demographic process.

New Forms of Employment: Temporary and Part-Time Work


I have also found a limited breakdown for part time work by age. The two categories which the Italian statistics office use are "15 to 34" and "35 and over". Now strange as it may seem the number of part-time jobs for the 15 to 34 age group actually went DOWN between Q1 2004 and Q3 2007 - from 1.107 millions to 1.102 million - while among the over 35s it went up from 1.74 to 2.121 million. So Italy's new part-time workers are by-and-large not young, and it is a good bet that the majority of these new workers come from the over 55 group, and that it this kind of work which is responsible for the increase in the participation rates at the higher ages.



Of course, when we come to look at TEMPORARY work the pattern is rather different, there are an increasing number of young people (and since the number of such people is steadily declining, a rising proportion) working on temporary contracts. The number has gone up from 1.035 million in Q1 2004 to 1.368 million in Q3 2007. Over 35s (which we can pretty much imagine as over 55s, since the 35 to 55 age group is normally pretty robust in employment participation terms) goes up from 679,000 to 993,000.

By Way of a Conclusion

Basically the macro economics of all this are hard to assess. Italy's working age population - ex migration - has touched the ceiling, and without immigration it will go down and down. So everything depends on raising the productivity of those employed. But raising productivity today is pretty much synonymous with raising the human capital component and if in volume terms the numbers of older but less qualified people working - and working in more and more fragile and less and less well-paid occupations - swamps the number of new highly educated workers in highly productive jobs (we are talking about aggregates here) then the new value created by the society in question won't compensate for the contraction in the workforce. This is particularly true when it comes to raising participation rates in that oft quoted potential labour supply, female workers over 55. Many of the women in question are excellent wives and mothers, but given their often very low level of formal education, and given their lack of real experience of work out of the home, the economic worth in value added terms of their formal labour market participation may be much lower than many expect, and certainly this is where the evidence to date is leading us.

I also feel that the Italian experience is very similar and comparable with what we have been seeing in Japan and Germany, so it seems to me that there is now strong prima facie evidence that we need a big and really systematic research programme into the details of all of this, and rather less of that "gung-ho", we haven't got a problem approach, which has prevailed up to now, and which - at the end of the day - is based on the idea that raising participation rates will do the trick. As we are seeing, and unfortunately, it may well not do. It will do something, but that something may well not be enough.

Wednesday, January 16, 2008

Bank of Italy Cuts Growth Forecast

The Bank of Italy on Tuesday slashed its forecast for 2008 gross domestic product, citing a worsening global outlook dominated by the US subprime crisis and rising raw material costs. In cutting its growth projection for the country to 1.0 per cent from 1.7 per cent, the central bank’s latest quarterly bulletin also warned of the degree of uncertainty which characterised the current climate and of the danger of a more serious slowdown in Italy and other developed economies.

GDP is expected to have grown around 1.8 per cent in 2007 and the government is currently preparing to cut its own growth forecast for this year in line with the Bank of Italy’s projection. Italy began to feel the full impact of the global slowdown late in the fourth quarter of 2007, the Bank of Italy said, warning of a ”concrete risk that credit conditions for firms and families may undergo a significant tightening”.

Back on the 6 January 2008 I put up a post here which included a forecast for 2008. In that forecast I included the following, which really does not look so "out of consensus" now that the Bank of Italy have made their substantial write-down:


As most of the forecasts suggest, we have been seeing growth which is somewhat above trend during the upswing in the last couple of years, so it would not be surprising if we now saw some below trend growth. Trend growth (over a 5 year average) in Italy may even have fallen into the 0.5 to 1% range, so if I have to put a number I would say 0.7% with a definite "downside risk" tag attached. The nearest forecast to this that I have seen is the 1% one from the Morgan Stanley GEF team. The implications of such sustained low growth are, I think, important, since if Italy cannot find the way to raise trend growth up towards the 2% mark there is simply no way the government debt can be stabilised and sustained. And with each passing year we have one year less to crunch time



Really we now need to see the data for GDP in the 4th quarter of 2007. The readout will undoubtedly be very low, and it could be that quarter-on-quarter growth was either flat or even slightly negative, in which case we may already have entered recession at the turn of the year. Just keep watching for those downward revisions, and look out for the impact on the fiscal situation.

Monday, January 14, 2008

Italian Industrial Output November 2007

Italian industrial production fell for a third month in November, adding to signs that growth in Europe's fourth-biggest economy is slowing. Production fell 0.9 percent from the previous month, when it dropped a revised 0.6 percent, the Rome-based national statistics institute, or Istat, said today. Economists expected an increase of 0.3 percent, according to the median of 25 forecasts in a survey by Bloomberg News.

``Everything is now pointing to a downturn,'' Maurizio Binelli, a senior economist at Abaxbank SpA.





The economic outlook for Italy's economy is getting bleaker and bleaker at the moment as weak domestic demand and the impact of a stronger euro on exports put the ecoonomy in a pincer vice. The euro's 15 percent gain against the dollar in the past year is adding to Italy's competitiveness problems as oil prices at around $100 a barrel pushes up energy bills, raising production costs and leaving families with less money to spend.



Production of consumer goods declined 0.3 percent from October, led by a 2.7 percent drop in the output of durable goods like refrigerators and washing machines. Output of non- durable goods gained 0.2 percent.





Italian business confidence declined to a two-year low in December, while a sub-index measuring manufacturers' expectations for production in the next three months fell to 11, the lowest since July 2005, according to the Rome-based ISAE report.






At this point - with declining retail sales, falling industrial production, credit crunch restricted construction issues and a weakening export outlook, it is hard to see where growth in going to come from in Q4, so I will simply reiterate what I said in my January forceast for 2008:

The OECD in December revised their 2007 Italian forecast down to 1.8%, and the 2008 one down to 1.3%. Confindustria also revised their forecast down in December, arguing that growth would slow to 1 percent in 2008 from an 1.8 percent this year, citing factors like the rising cost of food and oil and the rise of the euro against the dollar. Such numbers are clearly not encouraging, but arguably downside risk for 2008 is greater even than either the OECD or the Confindustria forecasts reflect Morgan Stanley's Vladimir Pillona is somewhat more sanguine. While presenting the MS central forceast for Italian economic growth to slow to 1.0%Y in 2008, from 1.8%Y in 2007, he goes on to note that "even annual GDP growth of 0.5%Y next year has a significant possibility of occurring, as shown by our model’s forecast error bands".


I personally will be very surprised if we still see calendar year 2007 anything like as high as 1.8%, but more to the point even 1.3% may be rather on the high side if we get a significant deterioration in the external environment, especially in Eastern Europe on which Italy is fairly dependent, and where the Italian banking sector has significant exposure. So that puts me much nearer to Pillona's "basement bargain" number of 0.5% than to any of the others. One of the reasons for my pessimism relates to my assessment of Italy's current trend growth rate, and to the level of fiscal and monetary tightening which may be operating on the economy even as it slows. During 2007 the Italian govenment has been running a fiscal deficit of comfortably below the 3% of GDP required by the EU commission. But since this fortunate situation was in part acheieved by the use of one off measures, and in part by the strong tax inflow from the above trend growth, the government will need to maintain a comparatively tight fiscal stance to keep things on course, and any attempt to further loosen may run into real problems with the EU commission and the credit rating agencies. And as I keep arguing, it is very hard to see an accomodative monetary posture from the ECB in the near future.

Sunday, January 06, 2008

Italian Economy Outlook Entering 2008

Evidence of a growing slowdown in the Eurozone economies continues to show up across the board. German retail sales, for example, fell for the third consecutive month in December according to the Bloomberg purchasing managers retail sales index released at the end of December. The index came in at a seasonally adjusted value of 44, compared with 43.6 in November. A reading below 50 indicates contraction. Retail sales across the entire 13 nations euro bloc also declined in December. In Spain the evidence for a sharp slowdown is quite general now, and only in France does the economy continue to show some level of resistance to the downward march.

Euro zone purchasing managers surveys for the manufacturing sector also tend to confirm the idea that the economy of most member states has slowed in the fourth quarter despite what seem to be pockets of resistance in some countries. The purchasing managers index for the euro zone manufacturing sector eased to a final 52.6 in December from 52.8 in November. The manufacturing PMI for the whole zone has managed to remain above the October low of 51.5, but the December reading is still the second weakest figure since Aug 2005.The German PMI eased slightly but held up better than expected, slipping to 53.6 from 53.7 against market expectations for a decline to 53.2.

While in Italy Things Continue To Go From Bad to Worse


Italian retail sales declined for a 10th successive month in December as a bleaker economic outlook damped consumer demand during what should have been the busiest shopping period of the year. The seasonally adjusted purchasing managers index of retail sales dropped to 44.7 from 45.3 in November. The reading has now been below 50, the level that signals a contraction in sales, since February. Even record low unemployment of 7.2 percent has failed to spur purchases, prompting retailers to expect lower sales next month.





The Italian manufacturing PMI also fell more than expected, declining to 50.7 from 51.3 (a level at which industry is just expanding, but only just), compared with expectations for a decline to 51.0. This meant the index was at its lowest level for more than two years.



Italian consumer confidence continues to trawl the bottom, falling to a four-month low in December as signs that economic growth is slowing prompted households to cut back on spending. The Rome-based Isae Institute's index, based on a survey of 2,000 families, fell to 107 from 107.6 last month.




And Italian business confidence declined to a two-year low in December after a strike by lorry driver disrupted production and as manufacturers brace themselves for the likelihood of slower growth. The Isae Institute's business confidence index fell to 91.8 from a revised 92.1 in November, the Rome-based research center reported today. That is the lowest since December 2005, when the index reached 91.5.



The pace of increase in Italian household spending - long a soft point in Italy's less than stellar performance even though it accounts for nearly two-thirds of Italy's economy - continues to decelerate, only growing by 0.2 percent in the third quarter when compared with the second, down from the 0.5 percent rise achieved in the second quarter, and the 0.7% q-o-q rate achieved in the first quarter.




Household spending won't be helped any by Italy's inflation rate, which jumped in December to the highest level in more than four years as record oil prices pushed up the cost of petrol and transportation. Consumer prices gained 2.8 percent from a year earlier, as calculated by European Union methods, the Rome-based national statistics office said. That's highest rate of increase since November 2003.



Italian GDP growth seems to have peaked back in the 70s (or maybe earlier, since I don't have data for the pre 1970 period), and indeed since 1990 Italian GDP growth has only managed an average of something like 1.4% growth per annum. As can be seen from the chart the rate of growth has been, if anything, even lower since 2001, and there is no good reason to believe that this underlying tendency has been reversed, indeed there are strobg theoretical reasons for anticipating quite the contrary, as Italy ages.



2008 Forecasts: The OECD in December revised their 2007 Italian forecast down to 1.8%, and the 2008 one down to 1.3%. Confindustria also revised their forecast down in December, arguing that growth would slow to 1 percent in 2008 from an 1.8 percent this year, citing factors like the rising cost of food and oil and the rise of the euro against the dollar. Such numbers are clearly not encouraging, but arguably downside risk for 2008 is greater even than either the OECD or the Confindustria forecasts reflect Morgan Stanley's Vladimir Pillona is somewhat more sanguine. While presenting the MS central forceast for Italian economic growth to slow to 1.0%Y in 2008, from 1.8%Y in 2007, he goes on to note that "even annual GDP growth of 0.5%Y next year has a significant possibility of occurring, as shown by our model’s forecast error bands".

I personally will be very surprised if we still see calendar year 2007 anyhting like as high as 1.8%, but more to the point even 1.3% may be rather on the high side if we get a significant deterioration in the external environment, especially in Eastern Europe on which Italy is fairly dependent, and where the Italian banking sector has significant exposure. So that puts me much nearer to Pillona's "basement bargain" number of 0.5% than to any of the others. One of the reasons for my pessimism relates to my assessment of Italy's current trend growth rate, and to the level of fiscal and monetary tightening which may be operating on the economy even as it slows. During 2007 the Italian govenment has been running a fiscal deficit of comfortably below the 3% of GDP required by the EU commission. But since this fortunate situation was in part acheieved by the use of one off measures, and in part by the strong tax inflow from the above trend growth, the government will need to maintain a comparatively tight fiscal stance to keep things on course, and any attempt to further loosen may run into real problems with the EU commission and the credit rating agencies. And as I keep arguing, it is very hard to see an accomodative monetary posture from the ECB in the near future. The IMF in their October World Economic Outlook came in with a similar figure of 1.3% for 2008, the Economist Intelligence Unit is forecasting 1.7% in 2007 and 1.4 in 2008, and the latter 2008 figure was also endorsed by the EU commission in its November forecast.

As I indicate, my own view is well to the downside of all this. The only apparent bright spot on the horizon is employment, but I am dubious that in the context of Italy's ageing workforce this will work through as some are hoping, as I expain at some considerable length in this post here. My opinion is that Italy will enter recession at some point during 2008, and that we may well have 2 consecutive quarters of negative growth. The continuing high euro will maintain pressure on Italian exports, and high oil and food prices will maintain pressure on the inflation front, at least in the firts half of 2008. At the same time, and despite rumours that Romano Prodi's government is compemplating a large tax cutting package, I anticipate that the fiscal environment will remain tight. Italy's large (106% GDP) accumulated debt, and the vigilance from the gentlmen at Standard and Poor's and the other credit rating agencies more or less guarantee that.

As most of the forecasts suggest, we have been seeing growth which is somewhat above trend during the upswing in the last couple of years, so it would not be surprising if we now saw some below trend growth. Trend growth (over a 5 year average) in Italy may even have fallen into the 0.5 to 1% range, so if I have to put a number I would say 0.7% with a definite "downside risk" tag attached. The nearest forecast to this that I have seen is the 1% one from the Morgan Stanley GEF team. The implications of such sustained low growth are, I think, important, since if Italy cannot find the way to raise trend growth up towards the 2% mark there is simply no way the government debt can be stabilised and sustained. And with each passing year we have one year less to crunch time.